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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 






~IARGARET JARDINE, et al, 
Appellants, 
vs 
WALLACE BUTTARS, et al, 
Respondents. 
CASE NO. 8177 
AND 
CASE NO. 8178 
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
Comes now the Appellants and move the Court to 
grant a re-hearing of the above entitled cases on the fol-
lowing grounds : 
1. That the Court erred in ruling that the transfers 
in question were not the results of undue influence by 
Respondents. 
2. That the Court erred in setting forth in its opin-
ion that the trial Court found that the transfers "were 
made because decedent believed the recipients of her 
gifts had not received a share equal to the other children 
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from their father's estate and she desired to equalize 
what she considered to have been an unfair distribution 
of that estate." 
3. The Court erred in failing to discuss the evidence 
in support of Appellants' contention as contemplated by 
the constitution of the State of Utah. 
4. The Court erred in failing to give its reasons, as 
provided for in the constitution of the State of Utah, in 
finding that the sale of the 10.25 acres of land to Res-
pondent Archulius Archibald for $500.00, where the un-
disputed evidence was that it was worth $2,000.00, was 
not the result of undue influence, overreaching, or fraud, 
and in finding that the transfer was not the result of 
undue influence, over-reaching and fraud. 
WHEREFORE, your Petitioners pray that this Pe-
tition for re-hearing be granted; that the errors above 
mentioned be corrected and the Court vacate its decision 
and sustain Appellants' contention that the transfers in 
question were the result of undue influence, overreaching 
and fraud. 
L. DELOS DAINES 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
GEORGE C. HEINRICH 
Logan, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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L. Delos Daines hereby certifies that he is one of 
the attorneys for Appellants in the above entitled cases 
and that in his opinion there is merit to this Petition and 
it is not filed for the purpose of delay. 
L. Delos Daines 
ARGUMENT 
We are mindful that in the great majority of cases 
after the Court has considered the cause no useful pur-
pose can be accomplished by re-argument of the matters 
decided by the Court. However, we believe that in view 
of the matters presented that the Court will give serious 
consideration to a re-consideration of these cases. 
The Court in its opinion alleges that the Trial Court 
found that the transfers "were made ,because decedent 
believed the recipients of her gifts had not received a 
share equal to the other children from their father's estate 
and she desired to equalize to what she considered to be 
an unfair distribution of that estate." 
In this respect we call the Court's attention to the 
Findings of Fact and we believe that after reading the 
same it will agree with us that the Court made no such 
finding. (See findings of Fact) 
We also call the Court's attention to the fact that 
it set forth in its opinion that the Trial Court found that 
there existed a confidential relationship hetween Mrs. 
Buttars and Archulius Archibald rand Wallace Buttars. 
In this respect the Respondentrs requested that the 
Trial Court find that there was not a confidential rela-
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tionship, the Trial Court refused to do and struck it from 
the findings. In line with this action Appellants then 
moved that the Court should find that a confidential 
relationship existed. The Court, however, refused to 
so find. However it did set forth that there existed by 
Mrs. Buttars and the Respondents a close and intimate 
relationship. (See Findings of Fact- Motion to Modify 
findings.) Thus, we did not believe, when we prepared 
our brief, that it would be acting in good faith had we 
have taken the position that the Trial Court made a find-
ing of confidential relationship although it would have 
been in our favor to have done so. Furthermore, it was 
unnecessary as the undisputed evidence unquestionably 
established this fact. We do not believe that the word 
''intimate" relationship is the same thing as a "con-
fidential" relationship. The word "intimate" is generics 
subject to various meanings and is not limited to that of 
a confidential relationship. There may exist a confi-
dential relationship without intimacy and there may be 
an intimate relationship without it being confidential. 
Further the trial court found that the relationship 
of closeness and intirnacy existed between Mrs. Buttars 
and all of her children, and in so doing it it could not 
have foun1d or intended to find that a confidential rela-
tion existed between Mrs. Buttars and all of her children 
for the facts did not support such a finding. 
Although, the holding by the Cou:r.t that the Trial 
Court found a confidential relationship is no prejudic~al 
to the Appellants, we call this error, together with other 
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lm error, to the Court's attention, as we believe the Court, 
.~~ irregardless of whether it changes the result of its 
W decision, will desire to correct the mrsquoting and mis-
interpretation of the r·ecords, and secondly, and equally 
important, we believe that the Court will understand the 
l:t reas·onwbleness of our conviction, that if the Trial Court 
u~ and this Cour't erred in such El·ementary matters that 
they erred in the more complex problems. 
Thus, in view of the Trial Court failing to find that 
a confidential relationship existed between Mrs. Buttars 
and her children, Wallace, and Archulius, the Colorado 
case of Mehlbrandt vs. Hall, 121 Colo. 165, 213 P. (2) 605, 
referred to by this Court in its opinion, is of no help to 
Respondents as a presumption of proper finding and ap-
plication of the law by the Trial Court falls and the pre-
sumption is of no help to the Court in weighing the evi-
dence. 
The Court in its opinion erroneously took .the posi-
tion that we assigned as error the Trial Court's failure 
to find that the decedent lacked mental capacity. On 
pages 20 and 21 of our brief that the question we were 
presenting was one of undue influence and not lack of 
mental capacity except as the impairment went to the 
question of undue influence, over-reaching and fraud. 
The Court will recall that with reference to Archulius 
we not only attacked the gifts but we also attacked the 
sale to her of 10.25 acres of land for $500.00. (See page 
56 of our brief). The undisput~ed evidence was to the 
effect that this property was worth $2,000.00. Archulius 
gave no reason for the transfer. Apparently it was a 
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business transaction at arn1s length and one where the 
grantee occupied a confidential relationship. She gave 
no reason for the inadequacy of consideration. Certainly, 
this transaction stands on a different footing than that 
of the gifts and yet this court in its opinion failed to 
distinguish between them and further failed to give its 
reasons for sustaining such a transfer. It would he en-
lightening to say the least, to know why this Court sus-
tained such a transfer and we believe that the constitu-
tion of the State requires that the Court ~should so en-
lighten us. 
The crux of the Court's opinion in finding that the 
gifts were not the results of undue influence was made 
upon the false premise that the Trial Court found, as 
hereinbefore pointed out, that the gifts were made to 
equalize the distribution of the father's estate. 
We recognize there was evidence to this effect al-
though we believed it was questionable and asfar as W al-
l'ace was concerned we pointed out in our oral argument 
that there was nothing to equalize as to him by reason of 
the fact that he inherited from his father when nine years 
old property which he had not helped to accumulate and 
which his mother, as guardian, had handled in such a 
manner, so that when he married he had property in 
excess of that given to and inherited by his brothers. We 
believe that this evidence which was undisputed should 
have carried greater weight with this Court in view of 
the questionable evidence of the so-called "independent 
witnesses." 
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Assuming, however, for purposes of argument, that 
~irs. Buttars intended for some reason to equalize the 
gifts as between her sons, we ask this Court when did 
such equalization end~ As we pointed out in our brief 
Mrs. Buttars gave Wallace the first 60 acres on March 
28, 1945, and that it had a value of approximately $12,-
000.00. Now, then, we ask the Court if this transfer did 
not take care of the equalization~ That is, by this trans-
fer had not Mrs. Buttars satisfied her intention, and 
that any transfer made thereafter, would certainly be 
the result of undue influence, overreaching and fraud, 
particularly in view of the fact that if she intended to 
give Wallace the second 60 ac:ves which took place on May 
6, 1948, why the hiatus in time of the gifts if they were 
given for the sarne reason~ We take it there is no reason 
and this Court in its opinion certainly did not attempt to 
justify it. We also call the Court's attention that the 
same theory would apply with reference to the gift of 
$5,000.00 savings account to Wallace which was made on 
January 28, 1947, the same day that Mrs. Buttars made 
a transfer of the 48 acres of land to Arehulius. 
W·e take it that the same proposition should apply 
to Archulius. That is, that if there was an attempt of 
equalization that Mrs. Buttars effected this when she 
made the gifts which were found in the safety deposit 
box, the stock an'd bonds, to which there was attached 
a statement to the effect that the stock and bonds were 
given because the mill stock she had inherited from her 
father '·s estate had become worthless. 
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We point out to the Court that the Buttars treated 
their sons :on a different basis than their daughters when 
it came to the gifts of real property. That is, during the 
lifetime of their father no gifts of real estate were made 
to any of the daughters, and none were made to any of 
the other three daughters by Mrs. Buttars. 
It appears to us and we would appreciate it if this 
Court would give some reason to the contrary why, if 
there was an intent to equalize the estate as to Archulius, 
that this intent did not cease when she 1nade the gifts of 
the bank stock and bonds, found in the safety deposit box, 
and why any transfers after that were not result of undue 
influence. We think it is significant that the transfer of 
the 48 acres of land to Archulius on J'anuary 28, 1947, 
was effected on the same day as the gift of $5,000.00 
savings account to Wallace. 
It should be kept in 1nind as we pointed out in our 
brief and in oral argun1ent that Archulius and her sister 
Hattie occupied the same position as to the mill stock 
which became worthless and that had their mother in-
tended that an equalization required the giving of 48 
acres of land to Archulius the san1e would apply as to 
her sister Hattie. Hattie received no gifts of real or per-
sonal property from her nwther other than that found in 
the savings box along with Archulius'. Further, why was 
not the transfer of the 48 acres of land made in March, 
1945 instead of January, 1947, if that was the intent of 
her mother that this transfer was to take care of the loss 
she suffered as a result of the mill stock becoming worth-
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less. This was the reason given by Archulius. 
With reference to the 01nega Investment Company 
vs. Woolley, 72 U. 47-!, 271 P. 797, this Court took the 
position that it was not in point for the reason that in 
that case there was an attorney-client relationship. In 
citing the case we recognized this fact. However, we did 
not believe that the Court's rule would be any different 
with respect to an attorney-client relationship than that 
of any other confidential relationship. In other words, 
if a confidential relationship arising out of attorney-
client relation requires independent advice, then inde-
pendent advice should be necessary in ~all confidential 
relationships. 
We cannot follow the Court's reasoning in holding 
that Mrs. Buttars was a woman of firm will and that her 
mental capacity had not been impaired (but we do not 
clailn incompetency at the time of the transfers in ques-
tion) particularly in view of the fact that if anyone knew 
of her mental condition it was her children. From casual 
conversations mental condition is not readily reflected, 
and the evidence of the independent witnesses on this 
respect, was the result of mere occasional conversations 
and as far as the doctor was concerned he talked 
to her for only about five minutes. Jier children knew 
her mental condition and with the exception of Wallace 
those who testified, all testified she had suffered serious 
mental impairment, an1d on this respect we point out to 
the Court that although Archulius was present during the 
trial of the will contest case she did not take the stand 
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and contradict the testilnony of her two sisters and her 
brother, which clearly showed without question that their 
mother was mentally ilnpaired. Apparently the jury in 
the will contest case recognized that the testilnony of the 
children was more reliable than that of witnesses whose 
opinions were based upon casual convers'ations. In line 
with this we again call the Court's attention to the fact 
that prior to any of the transfers in question that Archu-
lius and Wallace called the children together, because of 
the physical and mental condition of their mother, and 
it was then suggested that a guardian shoud be appoint-
ed. However, this was voted against because the family 
did not want to offend their mother nor did they want 
her condition known to the public. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, Appellants respectfully s~bmit that 
this Court should re-consider its decision and in so doing 
grant a re-hearing and hold that the transfers in question 
were the result ·of undue influence and fraud. 
Respectfully submitted: 
L. Delos Daines 
George C. Heinrich 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
